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may remedy the defect either by declaring the provision
equally operative upon all persons similarly situated, or by
declaring the provision inoperative as to all of them.6" In
deciding whether benefits should be extended or extinguished,
the court must be responsive to the dominant legislative
purpose. 62
The 1939 amendments to the original Social Security
Act first authorized payments to family members of the
worker spouse. In keeping with the purpose of Social
Security, "to provide a systematic program of protection
against economic and social hazards," they were intended
"to afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit." 63
The laudable purpose of "more adequate protection" should
be extended to families regardless of their non-compliance
with traditional family structures. If an equal protection
challenge to the Act is successful, the only resolution which
preserves the original purpose is to extend the benefits with-
out regard to sex.
61. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931).
62. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
63. H.R. REP. NO. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
IV. CONCLUSION
Legislative revision would probably be a more efficient
and realistic method of completely neutralizing the sex bias
in the Social Security Act than challenging each provision
on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, such an extensive
revision does not appear imminent, and current economic
conditions accentuate the need for immediate action to secure
equal benefits for non-traditional families. Multiple litigation
challenging these provisions could have the dual effect of
prompting Supreme Court review and encouraging Congress
to take action.
It is evident that a concise standard of decision has not
been developed for challenging sex classifications on equal
protection grounds. Therefore, in utilizing the present strict
scrutiny and reasonable relationship tests, it becomes crucial
to concentrate on the ultimate disadvantage to the woman
wage-earner due to sex bias in the Social Security Act. The
present trend indicates that such an approach will maximize
the chances that a challenge of sex discrimination will be
successful.
REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS IN MATTERS
RELATING TO HOSPITAL BILLS
by Stephen Axelrad,* Patricia A. Butler,' and Kenneth R. Wing*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal aid clients' problems often include unpaid medi-
cal bills (such as bills for hospitalization or physician services),
or denial of access to health care facilities. Unapid medical
bills frequently can be handled as other collection issues-
settled or defended according to the principles of consumer
law'-but certain problems may arise that are unique to the
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* * Associate Director, National Health Law Program.
* ** Staff Attorney, National Health Law Program.
The authors acknowledge the assistance of Helen Trilling and
Ruth Galanter in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, II
CONSUMER LAW HANDBOOK (1972), vol. 2, chap. 2;
B. Schick, A Primer on the General Law Applicable to Abusive,
Unfair and Harrassing Collection Practices, 6 CLEARING-
medical care situation, such as pre-admission deposits re-
quired for hospitalization.' Effective solution of these prob-
HOUSE REV. 145 (July 1972); C. BROSNAHAN, DEBT
COLLECTION TORT PRACTICE (1971) (pertains mainly to
California law, but is a good reference); Regulation and Licensing
of Collection and Commercial Agencies or Representatives
Thereof, 54 A.L.R. 2d 881 (1957); Greenfield, Coercive Collection
Tactics, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. In the experience of the National
Consumer Law Center physicians turn bills over to collection
agencies primarily to establish bad debts for income tax pur-
poses, but do not intend to pursue collection. For instance, the
physicians do not provide adequate information for the collection
agency to collect the debt, and when the debtor challenges the
collection attempt and the agency seeks more information from
the physician, the physician will probably advise the agency to
drop the collection effort.
2. Prepayment or pre-admission deposits are such a common prob-
lem that they deserve special attention. Some hospitals require
deposits on unreasonable terms; for instance, that the patient
pay an amount which is more than the predicted cost of his
hospitalization. Imposing a deposit is a severe hardship on the
patient, and it often denies hospitalization to patients who may
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lems requires understanding the various relationships
between the government, private medical care providers,
and consumers of medical care services. The legal and finan-
cial structure of provider institutions, particularly non-profit
hospitals, imposes a number of duties and responsibilities on
those institutions which may require them to provide care
for poor people. In addition, governmental beneficiary pro-
grams and governmental obligations may impose a duty on a
public institution, or a private institution with public funding,
to provide free or below cost care to the poor.
be able to pay for their hospitalization over time, but cannot pay
in cash in advance. There has been no universally successful way
to attack the validity of these deposits and prepayment require-
ments, but there are a number of possible approaches depending
upon the situation.
Medicare regulations generally prohibit a hospital or nursing
home from requiring a prepayment or deposit for covered services
(even for the deductible or copayment amounts which the patient
will ultimately have to pay) as a precondition to admission.
20 C.F.R. §405.610 (1970). Only if all of the following conditions
are met may a hospital or nursing home collect the patient's Part
A deductible ($84): (a) the facility regularly requires prepayment
from all other patients with similar insurance; (b) the patient is
expected to incur expenses for the services of a physician salaried
by the hospital or nursing home, which services are subject to Part
B deductible and co-insurance provisions; (c) plus either of the
following: the patient is not enrolled in Part B and has no equiva-
lent protection or the patient does have Part B coverage but has
not met the Part B deductible or cannot prove that he has.
Medicare Part A Intermediary Manual, HIM-13 §3307; Medi-
care Hospital Manual, HIM-10 §301; Medicare Skilled Nursing
Facility Manual, HIM-12 §254. The facility may charge a pre-
admission deposit for non-covered services or services determined
to be too costly. (See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (a) (2) (B) (1935). This
provision is a term of the Medicare participation agreement
between the hospital and the Social Security Administration,
and may be enforced by Medicare recipients as third-party bene-
ficiaries of the contract.
The Medicaid law does not specifically forbid a provider from
imposing prepayment deposits as a condition for admission, but
such a prohibition is implicit from the fact that the federal regu-
lations require providers to accept Medicaid payments as full
payment, 45 C.F.R. §250.30(a)(6) (1969). See Yanez v. Jones,
361 F.Supp. 701 (N.D. Utah 1973). Furthermore, the federal
statute spells out the kind of copayments which a state may
impose upon Medicaid beneficiaries, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(14)
(1972). In a state which does not impose copayment for the given
service, the provider has no authority to collect from the Medi-
caid patient. In a state which permits providers to collect co-
payment, one might argue that the provider could collect
estimated copayment as a preadmission condition. This issue is
not addressed in federal Medicaid regulations, but arguably is
illegal based on (a) the Medicare regulations cited above, 20
C.F.R. §405.610 (1970), and (b) the compelling purpose of
Medicaid to provide health care for the poor, unlike Medicare,
whose beneficiaries comprise both rich and poor.
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F.Supp. 550 (S.D.
N.Y. 1974) held that hospitals which received Hill-Burton funds
cannot count medical services toward their Hill-Burton obliga-
tion to provide a reasonable volume of free or below-cost care
unless a determination is made at the time of admission that the
patient will be given free medical care, 42 U.S.C. §291c(e); if
enforced, this will eliminate pre-admission deposits for such
patients. It is also possible that pre-admission deposits violate
the community services requirement of the Hill-Burton Act or
the obligation of tax-exempt hospitals to provide services to all
those in the community able to pay imposed by Rev. Ruling
59-545. See 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587 (Feb. 1974).
This article is designed to acquaint Legal Services
attorneys with a range of government health programs for
which their clients may be eligible, and a number of legal
theories that may impose a duty to provide care on public or
private medical care institutions. The primary objective is to
provide background material to assist the attorney in getting
medical bills paid or defending a collection action. The article
also includes a discussion of legal duties to provide care that
will be useful in advising clients and consumer groups of their
rights and of the programs and services that should be avail-
able in the community.
II. IS THE CLIENT ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID?
Medicaid3 is a federal and state program to pay
for medical care for the poor. All states have Medicaid pro-
grams. To be eligible a person must be either on AFDC or
SSI.' In some states people are eligible for Medicaid if they
would be on AFDC or SSI if their incomes or resources were
lower. Check with your county welfare department (for
AFDC persons) and the district office of the Social Security
Administration (for SSI persons) for details about your state's
eligibility standards for Medicaid.
If the client applied for welfare but was not informed
about his eligibility for Medicaid, the local welfare depart-
ment has violated federal regulations., If the client is eligible
for Medicaid, but had not applied before receiving services,
Medicaid will cover the bill if the services were rendered with-
in three months of the date of the application for Medicaid
(provided that the client was eligible for Medicaid when he
received the services). 6 If the client was receiving AFDC, but
has just become ineligible for such aid because of increased
income from employment, the family's Medicaid eligibility
must continue for four months as if the family were still
receiving AFDC.7 If the client is eligible for Medicaid but
the state refuses to pay for the particular medical service, the
state Medicaid plan may violate federal requirements;
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current
Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 7 (May 1974).
4. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A).
5. 45 C.F.R. §206.10(a)(2)(i). Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal. App.
2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969). An apparently untried argu-
ment is that since the county failed properly to inform about
Medicaid eligibility it is liable for the medical costs which the
client incurred. To assert this third-party cause of action against
the county welfare department, one must find that the federal
regulations give rise to an implied right of action for civil dam-
ages (see notes 29-31 and accompanying text). Local court pro-
cedures on impleader and third-party defendants may prohibit
such an indemnification attempt. A more serious obstacle is
sovereign immunity, which the county may raise. Edelman v.
Jordan, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (1974). Edelman could be distinguished on
the ground that counties are not the same as states for purposes
of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. See 94 S.
Ct. at 1258, note 12, but see Douglas dissent at 1366. To distin-
guish the case in this way one would probably have to show that
the county was not acting directly as a state agent in failing
properly to notify applicants of their right to apply for Medicaid.
The likelihood of success of this theory depends very much upon
state law on these issues.
6. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(34).
7. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(e), 45 C.F.R. §248.10(b)(l)(iii).
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW
HeinOnline  -- 8 Clearinghouse Rev. 542 1974-1975
hospitalization, for instance, is a required service,8 but length
of a hospital stay may be limited
If the hospital treated your client knowing that he was
eligible for Medicaid but now refuses to bill Medicaid, he
may have a defense against a hospital collection action on the
ground that the Medicaid statute implicitly requires the
hospital to bill the Medicaid agency. 9 This argument, relying
on the theory of the client's detrimental reliance and the
general public policy of the Medicaid statute, is more diffi-
cult if the hospital did not know or have reason to know that
the client was eligible for Medicaid when it admitted or
treated him (for instance, because the client had not applied
or had not yet received his card). Providers are generally
not required to participate in Medicaid or accept Medicaid
patients. However, if a hospital receives or has received
Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act funds or federal tax
exempt status (see discussion infra), it is required as a condi-
tion of receiving those funds to accept Medicaid patients.' 0
III. IS THE CLIENT ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE?
Medicare is the federal health insurance program for
the aged and the disabled who receive Social Security dis-
ability benefits." Medicare is administered by the Social
Security Administration (SSA). It covers hospital, nursing
home, and home health care services automatically (Part A)
and physician services only if the Medicare beneficiary sub-
scribes to the federal Supplementary Medical Insurance pro-
gram (Part B). All persons on Medicaid who are eligible for
Medicare should have been enrolled in Part B by their state
Medicaid agencies. Although most older people on Social
Security know about Medicare eligibility, some disability
recipients may not know. The local district office of the
Social Security Administration handles all questions about
Medicare.
Eligibility for Medicare is usually not a problem. But
problems often arise concerning the limits which Medicare
imposes on services for which it will pay. The law permits
insurance companies which administer payment under the
program (usually Blue Cross for Part A and Blue Shield for
Part B) to determine after they receive a bill (which is usually
long after the service has been rendered or the patient has
been discharged from the institution) that the service was
either not "medically necessary," was a routine physical
examination or was "custodial," which means that it did
8. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(a)(1).
9. Knickerbocker Hosp. v. Downing, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 688 (1971);
Society of Hospitals v. Mogensen, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 258 (1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 168 N.Y.LU. 73, at 2 (1972); Mt. Sinai Hosp. v.
Korngay, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1973); Brooklyn Hospital v. Criss,
349 N.Y.S. 2d 488 (1973).
10. In Cook v. Oschner, 319 F.Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1973), the court
ordered the Secretary of HEW to promulgate regulations requir-
ing Hill-Burton hospitals to accept Medicaid beneficiaries under
the community service requirement, and regulations have now
been promulgated. 39 Fed. Reg. 31767-68 (Aug. 30, 1974). A
tax-exempt hospital may also have to accept persons covered by
Medicaid or other adequate sources of third-party reimburse-
ment as being persons able to pay to qualify for tax-exempt status
under Rev. Ruling 69-545. See 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587
(Feb. 1974). EKWRO v. Simon, No. 74-1293 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 9,
1974), discussed infra.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§1395 et seq.
not require the services of a skilled nurse.' 2 The client can
appeal this decision through the SSA appeals process and
can eventually seek judicial review. I3 Many individual cases
which challenge Medicare claims denied on these grounds
have been successful.' In the meantime, however, one must
postpone the collection efforts of the hospital until disposition
of the Medicare claim.
A procedure to indemnify Medicare beneficiaries for
unpaid hospital claims is available because of the 1972 Social
Security Act Amendments, P.L. 92-603: the waiver of liability
provision."5 The SSA will assume the costs of medical care
which was denied because it was medically unnecessary or
custodial if both the medical provider and the Medicare bene-
ficiary did not actually know that the service would not be
covered and could not be expected to know of non-coverage
by exercising "due diligence." Requirements of due diligence
for medical providers are spelled out in proposed
regulations. 16 Even if the hospital or physician is deemed to
know that a service was not covered, the Medicare beneficiary
can still be indemnified for the costs of the care by SSA if
the beneficiary applies for indemnification.
Since the waiver provision applies only in cases where
services were rendered after October 31, 1972, many clients
who are now being billed for hospital services are ineligible
to apply for the waiver. In such cases another Medicare
defense is possible. Because Medicare does not require that
the provider seek authorization from SSA before providing
the services, the program relies heavily on internal hospital
committees (called Utilization Review Committees), com-
posed of physicians, to monitor whether Medicare patients
need continued hospitalization.' 7 Although the requirement
that such committees exist and make decisions about a Medi-
care patient's medical need for continued hospital care has
been mandated since enactment of Medicare, it is still not
observed by all hospitals. As a complete or partial defense
to a hospital bill which Medicare has refused to pay, one can
present the hospital's failure to perform utilization review
within the requirements of the Medicare law (which includes,
among other things, that patients be notified if the committee
recommends that their stay be terminated). 8 After receiviqg
such notice a patient is coverd by Medicare for three extra
days. '1
Four possible defenses may be raised to a hospital
collection action where the hospital has failed to comply with
Medicare utilization review (UR) requirements.2 First, if
12. 42 U.S.C. §§1395y(a)(1), (7) and (9). For a discussion of this
policy, see Health Law Project, Medicare Level-of-Care Deter-
minations, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 234 (Aug.-Sept. 1972).
13. 42 U.S.C. §1395g.
14. E.g. Sowell v. Richardson, 319 F.Supp. 689 (D. S.C. 1970);
Ridgely v. Secretary. of HEW, 345 F.Supp. 983 (D. Md. 1972),
aff'd 475 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); Bremer v. Richardson, 347 F.
Supp. 465 (D. Neb. 1972); Hultzman v. Weinberger, No. 73-
1917 (3rd Cir., April 3, 1974).
15. 42 U.S.C. §1395pp.
16. 39 Fed. Reg. 12763 (1974).
17. 42 U.S.C. §1395x(k) (1935), 20 C.F.R. §§405.1035 (1966) and
405.1627 (1968).
18. 42 U.S.C. §1395x(k)(4) (1935); 20 C.F.R. §405.1035(g) (1966).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7) (1935).
20. A model answer raising the defense is available in Volume 6 of
the MATERIALS ON HEALTH LAW (1972 ed.) at 225, pre-
pared by Health Law Project and National Health Law Program.
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the hospital had no UR plan at all, or if its plan on paper
did not meet statutory requirements, one might argue that
the hospital's contract to provide medical care to the Medi-
care patient was illegal and void ab initio, since the hospital
undertook to serve the patient as a Medicare provider, and
is required as a condition of Medicare participation to estab-
lish a UR system." Second, one can argue that a hospital's
failure to comply with its UR plan is a failure of a contractual
condition or a breach of contract.2 2 Third, one can argue
that the Medicare recipient is a third-party beneficiary of
the agreement between the government and the hospital."
21. Supra n. 17. When performance, such as providing medical care,
is part of an illegal contract, the courts will not enforce the con-
tract on behalf of the wrongdoers. Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F. 2d
44,45 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Courts have refused to enforce contracts
for services performed by unlicensed facilities or persons on the
ground that such performance is illegal. Spivak v. Sachs, 16
N.Y. 2d 163, 211 N.E. 2d 329 (1965); Carmine v. Murphy, 285
N.Y. 412, 35 N.E. 2d 19 (1941). And a court has held that a lease
entered into in violation of a housing code was void and that the
tenant had no contractual obligation to pay rent. Brown v.
Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). The
statutory requirement for Utilization Review demonstrates a
public regulatory policy similar to licensing standards or housing
codes so that a court should deny the hospital recovery for medi-
cal care provided in violation of the UR requirements.
22. Courts do imply conditions or promises into contracts to promote
justice and fairness, whether or not the parties have expressed the
intent to include such terms in their agreement. In Javins v. First
National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court
implied the requirement that a landlord comply with the provi-
sions of the D.C. Housing Code as a term of a lease. One can
argue that compliance with a UR plan is an implied term of any
contract (express or implied) between a hospital and a Medicare
recipient for medical services.
Failure of a constructive condition precedent would com-
pletely discharge the contractual duty of the Medicare patient
to pay the hospital bill. On the other hand, breach of an implied
promise to perform UR would not necessarily discharge the duty
to pay; the hospital would be liable for damages resulting from
the breach, which could be set off against the bill for services. In
Javins the court merely adjusted the tenant's rent, but did not
eliminate entirely the rent obligation. If one cannot convince the
court that compliance with the Medicare UR requirements is
sufficiently important to be a condition precedent to the Medi-
care recipient's duty to pay, one must be prepared to argue that
the hospital owes damages equal to the value of the medical ser-
vices disallowed by Medicare. The fact that the occurrence of a
condition precedent does not involve any uncertainty and that
the hospital's failure to comply with its UR plan is willful should
strengthen the argument against finding substantial performance
by the hospital and support a discharge of any contractual duty
to pay. Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E.
889 (1921).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc; although the terms of the agreement do not
specifically include a commitment to perform Utilization Review,
this term would probably be implied into the agreement. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc(d) and sources cited supra n. 17. The require-
ment of Utilization Review was intended at least partially to
benefit Medicare recipients, S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess: 47 (1965), although it was at least equally intended to save
money for the federal government. There is mixed authority on
whether individual members of the public can be protected as
intended third-party beneficiaries of contracts which the govern-
ment makes to benefit the general public. CALAMARI AND
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §247 (1970) (indi-
viduals may be so protected); RESTATEMENT 2d CON-
TRACTS § 145 (in general, individu als are not so protected);
Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) holds that the
Fourth, an argument closely related to the third-party bene-
ficiary argument is that there is a private right of action
implied on behalf of beneficiaries of the Medicare law."4
Whether a court will accept any of these Medicare UR
defenses depends ultimately on the policy considerations
involved rather than on a strict analysis of contract law, as
the landlord-tenant cases in the District of Columbia s
demonstrate. Important factors in arguing policy considera-
tions are the congressional intent to regulate for the benefit
of Medicare recipients, 2 the demands of fair dealing2 7 in
providing appropriate utilization review, and the justifiable
expectations"8 of Medicare recipients that they are receiving
all statutory protections to which they are entitled. It is
essential to emphasize the importance which Congress placed
on utilization review. Both the statutory requirement that
the federal government bar the hospital from further Medi-
care participation 9 or reduce payment to it'5 for failure to
conduct UR and the legislative history of Medicare" and
subsequent legislative analysis 2 and developments" demon-
strate such congressional concern. If the policy arguments
can be advanced successfully, there is ample contract law
and related theories on which to base a successful collection
defense.
poor do have a right to enforce the terms of contracts between
the federal government and hospitals which were adopted for
their benefit. If state law permits arguing that the Medicare
patient is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the
hospital and federal government, the patient could assert as a
defense to a collection action the same claim that the federal
government could raise in refusing to reimburse a provider with a
deficient Utilization Review system-the statutory prohibition
on payment to an institution which does not comply with the UR
requirements. 42 U.S.C. §1395f(a)(7), §1395x(k) and
§ 1395cc (d).
24. Courts have found such private rights of action under other
governmental programs. Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th
Cir. 1972); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d
569 (5th Cir. 1969). Under Medicaid, a court found that recipi-
ents of the program had an implied right of action under the
federal regulations against the state, but not against the indivi-
dual providers who violated the federal regulations. Yanez v.
Jones, 361 F.Supp. 701 (N.D. Utah 1973). This case is inconsis-
tent with other decisions on this issue in the Circuit Courts of
Appeal, and so should not bar the defense. A memorandum dis-
cussing these cases and the third-party beneficiary/private right
of action theories is available from the National Health Law
Program.
25. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (1968); Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d
571-72, 575-76 (Sth Cir. 1969); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d. 1115,
1118 (10th Cir. 1972).
27. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir.
1970); CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§632,653 (1952); CALAMARI
AND PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 141 (1970).
28. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp, 428 F.2d 1071, 1075, 1079, 1081
n.56 (10th Cir. 1972).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(k)(l) and (3) (1935).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(d) (1935).
31. S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1965); H.R. Rep. No.
213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess 40-41 (1965).
32. Staff of Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Medicare!
Medicaid: Problems, Issues and Alternatives, 105-109 (1970).
33. In 1972 Congress extended more comprehensive Utilization
Review requirements to the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396b(h)(1) and (i)(4)(1972).
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IV. IS THE CLIENT ELIGIBLE FOR SERVICES PRO-
VIDED BY THE VETERAN'S ADMINISTRATION
OR THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE OR PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE?
If your client is a veteran, an Indian, a merchant sea-
man, or a dependent of such person, he may be eligible for
hospital and other medical care through special federal
hospital systems. Although there appears to be no right of
indemnity against one of these providers by an eligible person
who is being sued by a hospital for the costs of a hospital
stay,34 you should be aware of these eligibility categories
in order to advise the client to seek care at these special
facilities in the future.
The Veteran's Administration is the nation's largest
health center, with 166 hospitals. To be eligible for its
hospital services one must be a veteran seeking care for (a)
a service connected disability; (b) a non-service connected
disability associated with a service connected disability; (c)
a non-service connected disability if the veteran was dis-
charged for line-of-duty disabilities. Veterans who are over
65 or have served during a war period or after January 31,
1955, are also eligible for care for non-service connected
disabilities. The last four groups are eligible for VA health
benefits only if they are financially unable to pay for the care
themselves. "
The Public Health Service operates hospitals in selected
areas of the country for merchant seamen, coast guards and
their dependents, and Indians.36  Eleven PHS hospitals
operate in coastal areas to serve those eligible.
Fifty-one additional hospitals on or near Indian reserva-
tions are run by PHS through the Indian Health Service
to whom administrative authority has been delegated.
37
Any person who can provide evidence of any "reasonable
factor of Indian descent"3 is eligible for IHS health services.
However, regulations permit the IHS to establish priorities
for treatment within the limits of available funds.3 9
V. IS THE CLIENT ELIGIBLE FOR LOCAL OR
STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCED MEDICAL
CARE?
Even if your client is not eligible for Medicaid, Medi-
care, or the other federal health programs, the state or local
government may still be responsible for the cost of his medical
care. At common law there was no duty on the state or any
of its political subdivisions to provide medical care to indigent
people. The poor depended upon charity for their medical
care as well as relief in general. However, as medical care
became recognized as an important human service, almost
every state passed some form of statutory authority mandating
that the state or some level of government provide health
34. Cf 42 U.S.C. §24a(c).
35. 38 U.S.C. §610 (1958); 38 C.F.R. § 17.47 (1959). For a more
detailed description of veteran's health benefits, see Merrill,
Medical Care in the Veterans Administration System, 6 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 424 (Nov. 1972).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§249-253 (1944).
37. 42 U.S.C. §2001 (1954).
38. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Indian Health
Manual, § 2-1.2A (5).
39. 42 C.F.R. .36.11 (1959).
care services to the poor either directly or through private
facilities with financing from the state or local government.
For example, the law of Arizona requires that counties
assume responsibility for medical care to indigent residents.
4 0
Other jurisdictions place the financial responsibility
on the state government, as in Massachusetts, or on "public
welfare districts," as in New York. Without presenting a
thorough survey of all states, it is safe to say that all states
have some provisions imposing a duty for care to indigents,
either by providing for a system of hospitals, or by requiring
a financial reimbursement scheme. This duty, however, may
not be concisely stated and may have to be inferred from a
number of vaguely worded statutory provisions. California
is a good example of this:
Every county and every city and county shall
relieve and support all incompetent, poor indigent
persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease,
or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such
persons are not supported and relieved by their
relatives and friends, by their own means or by
state hospitals or either state or private institu-
tions."
This has been interpreted by California case law, when read
in conjunction with other provisions of the California Code,
to mean that the county must provide for some level of
medical care and hospitalization to all its indigent residents.
42
One major issue that remains unresolved is the inter-
face between these laws and the Medicaid system. Does the
Medicaid coverage provided to some categories of indigent
people replace the state duty to provide care to all indigent
people under these previous state law requirements? As long
as there are indigent people not receiving care for any reason,
and the statutory basis for the duty to provide care is explicit
or is interpreted to mean that the obligation runs to all indi-
gent people, then Medicaid does not replace the pre-existing
duty. Using the California example, even with the broad
range of people covered under the California Medicaid (Medi-
Cal) program there are still some categories of indigents
(e.g. illegal aliens, people without permanent residence)
who are not eligible for Medicaid. Moreover, there are cer-
tainly many people who may be considered indigent under
the pre-existing duty requirements, but not under Medicaid,
e.g. people who must spend down to qualify or people slightly
above the Medicaid standards of eligibility. A recent Attorney
General's opinion in California concluded that California's
Medi-Cal program did not provide care to all indigents or
supersede the county's duty. 3
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 11-291. In a very important decision, the
Supreme Court recently decided that a provision of this statute
that imposed a one-year residency requirement was unconstitu-
tional. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 94 S. Ct. 1076
(1974). This case characterized medical care as a fundamental
interest (although not a fundamental right) comparable to wel-
fare benefits. This is the first recognition by the Court of the
importance of health care to poor people.
41. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 17000.
42. See City of San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187 (1932), Goodall
v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. 2d 540 (1936), County of San Diego v.
Viloria, 276 Cal. App. 2d 350 (1969), Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal.
3d 669 (1971).
43. 56 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 568 (1973).
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VI. IS THE CLIENT ELIGIBLE FOR CARE UNDER
THE PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS OF PRIVATE
NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS?
Under any of a series of relationships to the federal
government, private non-profit hospitals may incur obliga-
tions to provide free or below-cost care to the indigent. Both
the receipt of federal Hill-Burton funds and the receipt of
tax-exempt status carry such obligations. Since the litigation
strategy with respect to these particular obligations has been
discussed at length elsewhere, 44 only the basic legal theories
are reviewed here.
Many hospitals have received federal Hill-Burton con-
struction funds and have contracted to provide "a reasonable
volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor. . .,,
HEW has issued regulations interpreting what quantity of
free services satisfies this obligation and requiring states to
enforce this obligation.41 Several cases have established that
indigent persons have standing to enforce this obligation on
the basis that a civil remedy may be implied for those clearly
within the protective realm of legislation, and also on a third-
party beneficiary contract theory. Although these cases were
brought to compel hospitals to treat indigent persons, the
same theory can be used also as a defense against a collection
action by a Hill-Burton funded hospital in jurisdictions
which recognize the third-party beneficiary theory,47 or as an
implicit right under federal law in states that do not recognize
the standing of third parties beneficiaries.41
In many states (California, for instance), the agencies
which have the primary responsibility for enforcing the Hill-
Burton obligation have failed to promulgate regulations, in
open defiance of federal law." Legal Services attorneys
should assist their client communities in negotiating with
such state agencies to obtain proper regulations and
enforcement.
Hospitals that have received state or federal tax-exempt
status may also have a duty to provide free services to the
poor. In Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v.
Schultz, 5 the district court concluded that non-profit hospi-
44. Schwartz and Rose, Opening the Doors of the Non-Profit Hospi-
tal to the Poor, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 655 (March 1974);
Schwartz, Expanding the Quantity of Medical Services Available
to the Poor-Suing the Private Hospitals Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587 (Feb. 1974);
Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals,
8 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 351
(1973); Silver, The Legal Accountability of Nonprofit Hospitals,
REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION
183 (Havighurst ed. 1974); Rose, The Hill-Burton Act-The
Interim Regulation and Service to the Poor: A Study in Public
Interest Litigation, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 309 (1972);
Rose, The Internal Revenue Service's 'Contribution' to the
Health Problems of the Poor, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 35 (1971).
45. 42 U.S.C. §291 et seq. (1944).
46. 42. C.F.R. §53.111 (1972).
47. See Burlington County Memorial Hospital v. Smith (NJ. Dist.
Ct., Burlington County, Sept. 21, 1973), which resulted in a stipu-
lated dismissal. [Clearinghouse No. 12,059B Answer and
Counterclaim (5pp.); 12,059E Amended Answer (2pp.); 12,059F
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories (37pp.).]
48. See Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Cook v.
Oschner Foundation Hospital, 319 F.Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1973).
49. 42 C.F.R. §53.111.
50. 370 F.Supp. 325 (D. D.C. 1973).
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tals must provide free services to the poor in order to qualify
for tax-exempt status under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit disagreed and in a 2-1 split decision re-
versed, holding that the I.R.S. could properly define "char-
itable" in terms of community benefit and the general
promotion of health, as long as the hospital is required to
accept Medicare, Medicaid and other patients who could
pay the cost of their care either directly or through third
party reimbursement, and as long as the hospital is also
iequired to provide indigent persons with medical care in
the hospital's emergency room. 5 Many states have a similar
requirement that hospitals must be operated exclusively
for charitable purposes to qualify for exemption from
property or ad valorem taxes.5 2 In a recent Missouri decision,
the court stripped three hospitals of their exemption from
ad valorem taxes after finding that they used their profits to
further a policy of unlimited expansion of hospital facilities
while turning away almost all persons unable to pay. 3 A
private right of action may be implied under these statutes
in a similar manner to that suggested above under the Hill-
Burton Act." '
Vigorous collection efforts by non-profit hospitals can
be explained in part by the board of trustees' fiduciary duty
to preserve and protect corporate assets, which include
collectible debts from persons who are unable to pay. 5 These
hospitals, however, arguably have other fiduciary duties
obligating them to provide charitable services to persons
unable to pay. A non-profit hospital with collection practices
which do not make adequate provision for persons unable
to pay may be violating the following fiduciary duties." First,
51. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, No.
74-1293 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1974). Plaintiffs have petitioned for an
en banc hearing by the circuit court, and if this is denied, a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari would seem likely to the Supreme
Court. The proper construction of "charitable" in Section
501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code is also the subject of liti-
gation in federal courts in other circuits, and the Supreme Court
may eventually have to settle the question.
52. See the state-by-state analysis in 11-A HOSPITAL LAW
MANUAL, Taxation (Aspen Corp.).
53. Jackson County v. State Tax Commission, No. 765,274 (Mo.
Cir. Ct., April 17, 1974), reported at 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
372 (Sept. 1974) (Clearinghouse No. 13,286A).
54. See n.44, supra.
55. "The [governing] board must also enforce any rights to which
the hospital is entitled. This includes the collection of just claims
for hospital services using legal process when justified. Accounts
receivable are assets of the institution and should be collected
unless it is determined that the patient has no funds for their
payment. It is immaterial that the hospital is organized as a
charitable corporation. It should give charitable services only
when the patient does not have sufficient funds to pay the costs
of his care." Horty, Survey of Hospital Law, in AMERICAN
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN HOSPITAL
LAW. at 3 (1964).
56. See. Are Voluntary Hospitals Above the Law? 8 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 344 (September 1974). In Stern v. Lucy Webb
Hayes National Training School for Deaconnesses and Mission-
aries, 367 F.Supp. 536, 540 (D. D.C. 1973), the court held that
patients had standing to bring a class action for declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent continued injury to Sibley Hospital
caused by the breach of self-dealing and mismanagement of
hospital assets. In a later opinion, July 30, 1974, the court held
that declaratory and injunctive relief should be granted after
finding that the trustees had acted improperly.
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such collection practices may jeopardize the hospital's tax-
exempt status under state and federal law, in violation of
the fiduciary duty to preserve and protect corporate assets,
one of which is its tax-exempt status.57 Second, the hospital's
by-laws and articles of incorporation may indicate that the
hospital is to provide charitable services for the sick and the
poor; a policy of seeking payment from persons unable to
pay may violate the fiduciary duty to carry out the purpose
of the corporation and may also constitute ultra vires
conduct.58 Third, the hospital may have received private
contributions expressly limited to, for instance, provision of
medical care for persons unable to pay; the hospital may be
violating its fiduciary duty to make proper use of this money,
or may be able to make it available to your client.
VII. COULD THE CLIENT HAVE RECEIVED CARE
FROM A HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM?
Apart from any obligation to provide free or below cost
care to poor people, a hospital may incur a tort liability if
it refuses a patient access to emergency treatment. Although
this is obviously not a defense to the collection of an unpaid
hospital bill, it should be kept in mind when advising clients
as to the services that should be available to them.
Under the common law rule that still prevails in some
jurisdictions, there was no duty for a public or private hospital
to provide emergency care for all people requesting help. 9
This is a result of the traditional tort principle that there
is no general duty to take affirmative action to protect or aid
someone in peril. This notion has received considerable
criticism and the law has been changed both legislatively
and judicially in several jurisdictions. The modern approach
is that a hospital which has established an emergency room,
and is therefore holding itself out to the public as an available
emergency service, is under a duty to take some sort of appro-
priate action.
The leading case on this issue is Manlove v. Wilmington
General Hospital The court held that a hospital with an
emergency room must provide care in the case of an "unmis-
takeable emergency." The hospital in that case had refused
to admit a child without the request of the child's physician,
who was unavailable. The basis for the court's decision was
that there had been reliance by the plaintiff, thereby carving
out an exception in rather traditional terms to the original
tort principle denying affirmative duties to act. The court
explicitly stated, however, that a private hospital without an
emergency room would be under no obligation at all. The
court also rejected the theory that the hospital was a quasi-
public institution, due to its non-profit tax status, and that
it therefore owed a duty to provide care to the public. (In
57. "If the corporation is so organized and operated that it qualifies
for a tax exemption, the governing board must treat this exemp-
tion as an asset of the corporation to be preserved and protected
as any other asset. The hospital attorney should advise the
governing board when a contemplated activity jeopardizes this
tax exempt status." II HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Governing
Board, (Aspen Corp.) at 25.
58. Id. at 9. See also FLETCHER CORPORATION FORMS
(1960), § 14137.
59. Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So.
224 (1934). See generally, 35 A.L.R. 3d 841.
60. 53 Del. 338 (1961).
light of the recent decision in EKWRO v. Simon, 61 regarding
the duty of hospitals with tax exempt status to provide
emergency room care, this theory may still be worth urging.
The Manlove principle, the affirmative duty to provide some
kind of care in emergencies, has been recognized in at least
five other jurisdictions. 62
In some states, statutes impose a duty on all hospitals
to provide emergency medical care in some form to all people.
For example, in Illinois: 3
Every hospital required to be licensed by the
Department of Public Health pursuant to the
Hospital Licensing Act, approved July 1, 1953, as
now or hereafter amended, which provide general
medical or surgical hospital services shall provide
a hospital emergency service in accordance with
rules and regulations adopted by the Department
of Public Health and shall furnish such hospital
emergency services to any applicant who applies
for the same in case of injury or acute medical con-
dition, injury or serious illness.
In California the state licensing law includes a provision
6
that:
Emergency services and care shall be rendered
without first questioning the patient or any other
person as to his ability to pay therefor, provided
that the patient or his legally responsible relative
or guardian shall execute an agreement to pay
therefor or otherwise supply insurance or credit
information promptly after the services are
rendered.
If a health facility subject to the provisions of
this chapter does not maintain an emergency
department, its employees shall nevertheless exer-
cise reasonable care to determine whether an
emergency exists and shall direct the persons seek-
ing emergency care in obtaining such services,
including transportation services, in every way
reasonable under the circumstances.
VIII. IS YOUR CLIENT SUFFERING FROM DRUG
ABUSE OR ALCOHOLISM?
The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 con-
tains a provision requiring private and general hospitals
receiving any federal money to admit and treat drug abusers
suffering from emergency medical conditions.6" The Com-
61. Supra, n.50.
62. See, e.g., Mercy Medical Center of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago
County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 206 N.W.2d 198 (1973).
63. Chap. 111, No. 86.
64. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1317. For a
more detailed discussion of other possible legal bases for this
duty, see Culle, Hospital Duty to Provide Emergency Medical
Care for the Indigent and Medically Indigent, 4 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 297 (November 1970).
65. "Drug abusers who are suffering from emergency medical con-
ditions shall not be refused admission or treatment, solely be-
cause of their drug abuse or drug dependence, by any private or
public general hospital which receives support in any form from
any program supported in whole or in part by funds appropriated
to any Federal department or agency." 21 U.S.C. §1174(a).
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prehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treat-
ment, and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974 contains
a provision intended to assure that alcoholics will be able to
receive treatment in public and private hospitals receiving
federal funds. 66 The Secretary of HEW is required to make
66. "Alcohol abusers and alcoholics who are suffering from medical
conditions shall not be discriminated against in admission or
treatment solely because of their alcohol abuse or alcoholism,
by any private or public general hospital which receives support
in any form from any program supported in whole or in part
by funds appropriated to any Federal department or agency."
42 U.S.C. §246 (a), P.L. 93-282.
regulations and to enforce these provisions."' Litigation
strategy similar to that used to obtain access of poor persons
to hospitals under the Hill-Burton Act can be used to obtain
access for drug and alcohol abusers. The Secretary can be
required to promulgate regulations and individual hospitals
can be sued to force compliance.6"
67. 21 U.S.C. § 1174 (b) and 42 U.S.C. § 246 (b), respectively.
68. For a more detailed discussion, see, Hospitals May Not Refuse
Treatment to Drug and Alcohol Abusers, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 426 (October 1974).
MIGRANT LEGAL ACTION PROGRAM, INC.
1919 K St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 785-2475
Occupational Safety and Health Protection
for Farmworkers
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§651 et seq., was enacted in 1970 to provide a safe and
healthy working environment for all American workers,
including farmworkers. The Act envisioned promulgation
of health and safety standards which employers would be
obligated to implement, providing safe and healthy working
conditions for all employees. Unfortunately, this protection
has not been extended to the farmworkers of America.
Farmworkers sorely need the health and safety protec-
tions intended by the Act. Agriculture is the third most
hazardous industry in the United States, and farmworkers
suffer the lowest life expectancy of any group in the country.
While the typical white American male is expected to live 72
years and the typical ghetto resident 55 to 60 years, the farm-
worker has a life expectancy of only 49 years. There are
numerous aspects of agricultural work-from farm equip-
ment to field sanitation to labor camp conditions-to which
safety and health standards could and should be addressed.
Currently, however, there are only four standards in
the Act applicable to agriculture, and only one, the temporary
labor camp standard (29 C.F.R. 1910.142), is generally
applicable to farmworkers.1 Ironically, OSHA has had a
published policy of not enforcing this standard: OSHA field
offices were instructed to inspect a labor camp only when a
complaint or catastrophe report was filed. OSHA now
promises to change its enforcement policy in agriculture to
1. Regulation of pesticides, the are of most hazard to the farm-
worker, has been ceded to the Environmental Protection Agency
in spite of initial responsibility for this area on the part of OSHA,
and in spite of the absence of enforcement authority on the part
of the Environmental Protection Agency. An adverse decision
with regard to OSHA's responsibility in this area has been
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Omica v. Brennan, No. 74-54 (D.C. Cir. filed 1974).
conform with general enforcement for other industries, after
promulgation of a new temporary labor camp standard.
This proposed standard (30 Fed. Reg. 34057) makes a
number of extreme changes in the present standard:
(1) the housing standard will no longer be applicable to
temporary farmworker housing owned, managed or
controlled by the employer unless the farmworker can
establish that he was required by his employer or by
practical necessity to utilize such housing;
(2) housing shall no longer be required to be structurally
sound, in good repair and in sanitary condition, pro-
viding protection against the elements-only a water-
proof roof will be required;
(3) only 50 square feet per employee shall be provided
within the shelter-no square footage of space is
required for nonworking children of employees;
(4) there is no space requirement between beds and thus
no limit on the number of beds or occupants of any one
dwelling;
(5) only one toilet per 15 employees is required; where there
are over 150 employees, only one toilet for each addi-
tional 40 employees is required;
(6) no windows are required so long as some ventilation is
provided; and no screening is required so long as insects
are kept out;
(7) no electricity is required so long as some form of lighting
is provided;
(8) garbage, toilet, bathing and handwashing facilities needT
not be accessible to the sleeping area.
Ninety percent of the changes in the revised proposed
standard have either weakened the existing requirements or
made them practically nonenforceable. These revisions are
particularly horrifying in light of the fact that the Department
of Labor, HEW and the Farmers Home Administration
have found that the majority of existing farmworker housing
is substandard, unsafe and deteriorated. If the subminimal
standard above were enacted, it is hard to imagine how the
already squalid living conditions of the farmworkers could
improve.
Since the Occupational Health and Safety Act was
enacted and four standards were picked up for agriculture
from other areas, no new standards have been promulgated in
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